

AFF ANSWERS

IGNORES RACE

Ecofeminism ignores the role race plays in domination and will never be able to solve for the oppression of women of color.

Taylor 97 - Professor, Environmental Justice Field Of Studies Coordinator at the University of Michigan (Dr. Dorceta E. "Ecofeminism: women, culture, nature" edited by Karen J. Warren, Ch. 3 Women of Color, Environmental Justice, and Ecofeminism, Book) */LEA

Environmental justice activists argue that when certain environmental issues affected primarily people of color, there was a tendency to claim that the issue was not environmental, therefore not worthy of or suitable for discussion by environmentalists. A case in point involves the struggles of the United Farm Workers to stop companies from spraying pesticides on workers, to document jobrelated illnesses (such as increased incidences of birth defects), to be protected under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and to have employers provide toilets and water in the fields. These struggles were not widely supported by environmentalists, who saw these issues as labor and health issues, not environmental issues. Yet when there was an outbreak of Mediterranean fruit flies and the State of California decided to spray malathion to stop the spread of the flies (i.e., in areas where white residents lived), there was a huge outcry from many in the environmental community as well as other citizens outraged at the spraying. The issue of malathion spraying was then transformed into an environmental issue, and claims of risks and potential birth defects became credible (claims that could be made because of the availability of data gathered on Latina farmworkers).²⁶ Another aspect of this spraying that environmentalists and most of the public failed to notice was its discriminatory nature. Environmental justice activists argue that the pattern of spraying was discriminatory: residents in a Latino neighborhood claimed their neighborhood was sprayed more often than white neighborhoods.²⁷ Similarly, the case involving AsianAmerican women who work in Silicon Valley and have reproductive and other health problems has been perceived as a labor and health issue. Consequently, the plight of these women has received scant attention in environmental circles. However, environmental justice activist Pam Tau Lee and others consider the problems the AsianAmerican women face as environmental problems and are collaborating with labor groups on the issue. Lead poisoning is another case in point. When gasoline contained lead and the potential for lead poisoning was widespread, there were high levels of public concern over lead. Now, with lead removed from gasoline, AfricanAmerican and Latino children are most at risk for exposure to high levels of lead,²⁸ and lead is no longer a highpriority issue for many environmental groups. People of color have pointed to such narrow, often inflexible definitions as types of discourses that have an exclusionary or marginalizing effect on people who do not share the same perceptions, experiences, and world view as those from the dominant, most powerful environmental organizations. There is strong resistance to new ideas, new definitions, and new kinds of discourses from these organizations.²⁹ Because people of color define the environment more broadly, look at the disproportionate effects of hazards on race, gender, age, and social class, and take innovative alternative approaches to solving environmental problems, they are often excluded from crucial environmental dialogues. Alternative Focus Recognizing that a narrow definition limits the discussion and the approach to problem solving, environmental groups of color are attempting to change the way environmental issues are looked at. They see peopleofcolor communities, urban and poor rural, as environments worthy of attention and understanding. This is in contrast to other sectors of the environmental movement that focus primarily on wildlife habitats or wildlands as the environments for which they seek health and sustainability. The ethnic minority environmental groups see the human environment as being intricately linked to the physical environment, and they believe the health of one depends on the health of the other.³⁰ Therefore, if the human environment is poisoned or has been targeted to be poisoned, if there are no opportunities for economic survival or nutritional sustenance, or if there are no possibilities to be sheltered, then these human environmental issues have to be dealt with before, or in conjunction with, other kinds of environmental issues. This is not an attempt to make humans dominant over the rest of nature□ it is a way to say that humans, particularly people of color who have been ignored or thought of as expendable by many capitalists and environmentalists, are a part of the ecosystem. It is a way of bringing people of color back into the equation. People of color want to stop the destruction of the earth, not dominate it. This position was clearly articulated in discussions and in the principles of environmental justice adopted at the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, already listed. Environmental justice activists are critical of the tendency to compartmentalize and fragment ideas and knowledge of the environment, environmental problem definition, and problem resolution. Such fragmentation has contributed to the neglect of minority communities. These activists do not partition the environment and discuss it in separate spheres. They do not separate the home sphere from the work sphere, the leisure/recreation/outdoor sphere from the religious/spiritual or political sphere. These spheres are all linked when they define a problem or fight or resolve issues. This occurs because people of color often live, work, play, and worship in the same environment or community setting. A definition

of environment that requires the individual to focus on forest or wilderness protection without any consideration of health, occupational safety, or recreation is not an option for people of color. In the communities from which they hail, one cannot attempt to improve any aspect of environmental quality without trying to improve the human quality of life and vice versa. This vision is more holistic than the disjointed approach taken by most environmentalists. Although basic ecological principles and the rhetoric of most environmental groups advocate a holistic approach to dealing with environmental issues, in practice many environmentalists think about the environment in fragmented ways. Environmental justice activists are striving to be more holistic in their approach to environmental activism. Other sectors of the movement, such as deep ecology and ecofeminism, also advocate a holistic approach to environmental activism. 31 Building Alliances The alliances that were important in the civil rights movement have also become important in the environmental justice movement. People of color have embarked on this quest for environmental justice in close partnership with religious institutions. For example, the Commission for Racial Justice of the United Church of Christ has emerged as a major player in this movement through its involvement in the Warren County campaign, its production of the Toxic Wastes and Race document (1987), and its cosponsorship of the 1991 People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit. In addition, there is a strong alliance with labor and occupational health and safety groups. This being the case, issues that other environmentalists would consider outside their domain are issues that environmental justice activists focus on. Civil and Environmental Rights In 1962, Carson (Silent Spring) presented a chilling documentation of the effects of pesticide production and use. In addition to reevaluating the use of pesticides, she argued that individuals had a right to be protected from poisons applied by others to the environment and that they should have a right to legal redress when this right is violated. Thirty years later, environmental justice groups are making a similar argument about harm and redress. They argue that individuals have a right to safe jobs, housing, and environments. They say that civil rights cannot be separated from environmental rights and environmental justice. 32 That is, when people of color are forced to live with disproportionate numbers of solid waste dumps, incinerators, and toxic production facilities in their backyards and to take hazardous jobs, and when the patterns of siting dangerous facilities have been shown to be discriminatory, then people's civil rights have been violated. They don't just fight for an end to toxic exposures□ they link this fight to increased opportunities for safer jobs, improved health, and safer communities. Political Strategies People of color have not only brought the notions of civil rights and environmental rights to the forefront of the environmental debate□ they have also reintroduced civil rights strategies as a means of accomplishing their goals. Grassroots demonstrations, toxic marches, civil disobedience, mass arrests, lawsuits, community organizing and education, crafting legislation, and skillful use of the media are some of the more successful strategies being used.33 Table 5 compares traditional and environmental justice political strategies. As one can see, environmental justice groups are using radical and revolutionary directaction strategies in combination with more mainstream and institutional tactics, such as filing lawsuits. It is striking how much public education, research, and community organizing these groups engage in. In contrast, the traditional and well-established environmental organizations rely on radical, directaction political strategies. Some activists involved in these campaigns had little or no knowledge of environmental issues or had little training in political activism and civil disobedience when they started their first campaigns, yet they were willing to advocate environmental causes. For example, in South Central Los Angeles, AfricanAmerican women such as Shilela Cannon (of Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles) and Latinas such as Juana Gutierrez (of Mothers of East Los Angeles) fought hard to stop an incinerator from being placed in their neighborhood. In another example, AfricanAmerican women such as Dollie Burwell, along with men and children, stood and lay in front of trucks in Warren County, North Carolina, to prevent them from taking toxics to the dump.34 Scenes like these have been repeated all over the country, with people of various racial and ethnic groups participating. Environmental justice groups are critical of industry and the way in which industrial activities affect minority communities, but they also criticize environmentalists for ignoring the conditions in minority communities and for the way in which environmental agendas are set. Consequently, they have embarked on a strategy to isolate the most powerful and influential environmental organizations and scrutinize them publicly. This strategy has left these highprofile environmental groups groping for responses to questions relating to the racial composition of their membership, workforce, and boards□ their hiring practices□ and their past and present actions and agenda. People of color have also demonstrated that alliances of progressive environmentalists, policymakers, religious organizations, social service organizations, academics, and labor can make for a vibrant and healthy movement□ the numerous conferences, workshops, and research projects that have resulted from these alliances have enhanced the growth of the movement. People of color have used the spiritual, intellectual, and political energies and the talents of activists to identify the needs of their communities and to chart a course of action to meet these needs. Women of Color and the Environmental Movement The role of women of color in the environmental justice movement cannot be understated. In no other sector of the environmental movement (not even in the more progressive or radical sectors) can one find such high percentages of women of color occupying positions as founders and leaders of organizations, workshop and conference organizers, researchers, strategists, lawyers, academics, policymakers, community organizers, and environmental educators. As table 6 shows, 49% of 205 people of color environmental justice groups had women as founders, presidents, or chief contact persons. In twentytwo of the thirtynine jurisdictions listed, more than 50 percent of the groups had women leaders. A similar analysis in Malaspina et al. (1993) shows that 59 percent of the environmental justice groups profiled were led by women, many of whom were women of color. Similarly, about 48 percent of the delegates attending the People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit were women of color. 35 Table 7 shows that much lower percentages of the women are listed as occupying leadership positions in the traditional, mainly mainstream, predominantly white organizations. Ecofeminism There is no question that ecofeminists broke new ground when they began arguing that the capitalist exploitation of resources was connected to the degradation of nature and women. They introduced a feminist perspective to traditional ways of perceiving and relating to the environment that was badly needed. This type of critique, long ignored in a maledominated

movement, opened up the discourse and expanded the environmental debates to some extent. However, despite the ecofeminists' success in getting gender issues and alternative critiques of the capitalist, patriarchal system into the environmental dialogue, they, like other environmentalists, have done little to bring the issues of central concern to women of color (and men of color) to the forefront of the environmental dialogue in a consistent and earnest way or to make such issues a central part of their agenda. Although some ecofeminists are making an effort to increase their awareness and deal with issues of immediate concern to women of color, there is still much to be done to ameliorate the situation. This part of the chapter explores differences and similarities between women of color environmental justice activists and ecofeminists. It also discusses changes that will have to occur within ecofeminism if it is to become more attractive to environmental justice activists of color. Ecofeminists match the racial and socioeconomic profiles of traditional environmentalists, that is, they are predominantly white and middle class. However, they differ significantly from members of traditional environmental groups when it comes to the role of women. While males control the discourse (formulating theories and policies and setting agendas) and leadership positions in most of the traditional and well-established sectors of the environmental movement, in ecofeminism women define the movement and the theories, control and disseminate ideas, and craft political strategies. The white women who consider themselves ecofeminists have founded, defined, and shaped a movement that reflects their perceptions of reality, their experiences, and their cultural heritage. Consequently, it does not come as a surprise to most women of color that as it is currently conceived, ecofeminism does not adequately consider the experiences of women of color—neither does it fully understand or accept the differences between white women and women of color. According to ecofeminist scholars, there are four types of feminism—liberal, Marxist, radical, and socialist—and two kinds of ecofeminism arising from them: radical ecofeminism is the more common.³⁶ While some feminist, including Simone de Beauvoir, repudiate the woman-nature connection, claiming that such arguments have a negative impact on women,³⁷ radical ecofeminists affirm the woman-nature connection.³⁸ Some womanists also associate the domination and destruction of nature with the abuse of black women's bodies.³⁹ The typology laid out by ecofeminists is not very helpful in trying to understand the lives, experiences, and activism of women of color—it doesn't even recognize womanism or any of the other kinds of feminism with which women of color strongly identify.⁴⁰ Although African American women and other women of color have repeatedly argued that the foregoing formulation does not adequately reflect their experiences, ecofeminists still adhere to it. There is a slight glimmer of hope that change is possible. A few ecofeminists have started making references to many feminisms and ecofeminisms, but even these ecofeminists do not attempt to make fundamental changes in the definition.⁴¹ As long as this basic definition remains intact, women of color will not be lulled into thinking there has been fundamental change and will continue to raise questions about typologies and definitions. Race and Domination One reality that ecofeminists continue to miss is that women of color cannot simply aim their criticisms at patriarchy or at men and cannot seek liberation only for themselves. The political activism of women of color in the environmental justice movement is very complex. These women of color will agree that they are fighting gender issues (e.g., toxics invading the home and workplace and threatening their lives, health, reproduction, and families), but they will also argue that they are fighting much more than that. Their fight is also about racial and sexual discrimination, inequality, civil rights, and labor rights. The feminist and ecofeminist framework laid out by scholars fails to capture this complexity or the uniqueness of women of color environmental justice activism. Male domination and the institutions of patriarchy are major components of the ecofeminist critique of society. While ecofeminists perceive that they are dominated by white men and seek to eliminate patriarchal barriers, women of color perceive their inequality differently. They are dominated not only by white men but also by men of color and by white women. In addition, they work closely with men of color who are also dominated by white men, so while ecofeminists perceive a unidirectional form of domination (in which females do not dominate and in which their dominator is not dominated), women of color perceive sexual domination differently. The domination is multidirectional, and both males and females are dominated or are dominators. Therefore gender equality for women of color means something quite different from what it means for white women. While both white women and women of color have some commonality in the fact that both groups are oppressed by men, women of color have to deal with oppression from women, too.⁴² Whereas there is much discussion in ecofeminist writings about opposite-sex oppression, there is a distinct reluctance to discuss same-sex oppression.

ESSENTIALIZES NATIVES

Ecofeminism's conceptions of "ecologically noble" Arctic peoples is relies on racism that is ingrained in the movement.

Buege '97- Environmentalist and author of "If a Tree Falls" (Douglas, "Epistemic Responsibility and the Inuit of Canada's Eastern Arctic", edited by Karen J. Warren, book) */LEA

Karen J. Warren's ecofeminist philosophy reconceptualizes theory as theory-in-progress□ her metaphorical ecofeminist quilt is stitched from a collection of individual ecofeminist narratives that combine to create ecoeminist theory (Warren 1990). Each patch of the quilt is informed by three areas: feminism□ science, development, and technology□ and local and indigenous knowledge (Warren 1992). The present work offers direction in creating patches for this quilt representing narratives of Inuit cultural groups. Warren maintains that patches for the ecofeminist quilt must meet certain boundary conditions. In this chapter, I am further explicating Warren's first boundary condition: "nothing gets on the quilt which is naturist, sexist, racist, classist, and so forth" (Warren 1990, 141). Inuit ways of life need to be represented in ecofeminist theory, but European-American perceptions of the Inuit must be examined in order to prevent these perceptions from being racist, classist, or sexist. I maintain that the Inuit are subject to treatment that is not commonly understood as, yet is, racist, sexist, and classist. "Primitive" Ideologies In this section, I will discuss some central issues involved in including indigenous peoples' knowledge in ecofeminist theory. I think it is reasonable to say that before non-Inuit people can understand any Arctic cultural groups, we (non-Inuit) must examine how our perceptions of these people are already structured. We have preconceived notions of what life is like for dwellers of the Arctic. We also have misconceptions of what the Arctic is as a physical environment. 4 It would go against our core beliefs for those of us involved in ecofeminism to ignore misconceptions that may make our theory problematic. In the 1920s, filmmaker Robert Joseph Flaherty made and released the documentary Nanook of the North. This silent film was a box-office smash in the United States, Canada, and Europe. Flaherty described his intentions in making the movie: "I wanted to show the Inuit. And I wanted to show them, not from the civilized point of view, but as they saw themselves, as 'we the people' " (quoted in Griffith 1953). Despite Flaherty's intentions, people were drawn to the exotic culture of the "Eskimos"⁵ depicted in the film and romanticized a lifestyle that was so incredibly different from the day-to-day existence they experienced in Cleveland, Paris, or wherever. Visions of Nanook standing on the ice in caribou skins thrusting a spear mesmerized audiences and invited them to fantasize about life in the Arctic. This film did not present Nanook and his kin as political, intellectual beings□ it portrayed them as savages with subsistence lifestyles, emphasizing the severity of such existence. Audiences, stunned by the harsh environmental conditions, could not avoid being awed by this severity. I contend that many of the perceptions of Nanook's culture this film fostered are still alive today, more than seventy years after Nanook himself starved to death. Marianna Torgovnick discusses perceptions of peoples such as the Inuit in her book *Gone Primitive*. She explains how the idea of primitive cultures elicits many widely held preconceptions: Primitives are like children.... Primitives are our untamed selves, our id forces-libidinous, irrational, violent, dangerous. Primitives are mystics, in tune with nature, part of its harmonies. Primitives are free. Primitives exist at the "lowest cultural levels"□ we occupy the "highest," in the metaphors of stratification and hierarchy commonly used [by some anthropologists]. (Torgovnick 1990, 8) She argues that these conceptions of primitive people do not arise out of a knowledge of these people□ instead, such ideologies are created by outsiders, European- Americans, in order to shape the Inuit and other groups into something we desire. Perhaps we are thrilled by the idea of savages living in a severe climate under the harshest of social and economic conditions. If that is what we desire, that may be how we view the Inuit. 6 Our conceptions of indigenous people are not merely descriptive□ they also carry normative force. When I visited Baffin Island, NWT, in 1988, I was taken aback by the acned teenage Inuit wearing acid-washed blue jeans and leather bomber jackets, playing video games. I didn't want the Inuit to be like people back home in Wisconsin. I wanted them to be rugged, dressed in the native garb I had come to expect. My vision of what it means to be Inuit involved my deciding what an Inuit should be. Such ideas, when expressed, tend to undermine the self-determination of the Inuit people. They also expose prejudices that I have, prejudices that should not be included in ecofeminist theory, even though ecofeminists do acknowledge the inevitability of these prejudices, given our social history. One particularly potent ideology concerning indigenous peoples is the idea of the "ecologically noble savage."⁷ We are led to believe that the Inuit are particularly ecologically responsible people, that they are in harmony with their natural environments. But such a viewpoint cannot stand up to the scrutiny it deserves. The Inuit took to guns and ammunition, steel pots and tools, Skidoos and television, very quickly. Many are willing to exploit the natural resources on their land holdings. The North Slope Inupiat of Alaska have taken strong prodevelopment stances, prompted by the possibility of gaining economically from the sale of oil from their land (Eathorne 1991). The conception of the ecologically noble savage is challenged by much evidence, yet seems to be maintained. One problem with the ideology of the ecologically noble Inuit is that it leads us to expect a certain type of behavior from the Inuit, a behavior that they do not live up to and that often proves damaging to their cultural integrity. To expect the Inuit to return to their traditional hunting ways is to impose our values upon them, values that we obviously do not hold as strongly toward our own societies. Since ecofeminists cannot knowingly perpetuate sexism, racism, or classism, we cannot expect the Inuit to abandon their Skidoos and motorboats, along with all the other "luxuries" of a market economy, so

that they live up to our expectations. A more significant problem that stems from viewing the Inuit as primitive is that such a perspective comprehends the Inuit as children, as people who need to be taken care of in this modern world, a world to which they are quite foreign yet with which we European-Americans believe we are quite well acquainted. 8 The result of this view is that we find a need to minister to their religious, political, educational, and economic needs. Thus the Inuit tend to become reliant upon the systems we set up to benefit them, creating a self-perpetuating cycle of dependence which seems to confirm our original ideas of the primitive as child. In effect, the ideology of the primitive serves as a seemingly irrefutable rationalization for patriarchy. Warren maintains that any theory that is considered ecofeminist must be antiracist, anticlassist, and antisexist (it rejects "all other 'isms' of social domination as well") (Warren 1990, 141). Ecofeminism must also be antiprimitivist. An awareness of primitivism is important for ecofeminist theory concerning the Inuit, as well as many other cultural groups that have traditionally been stereotyped as primitive.

Ecofeminism's essentialization of American Indian women prevents effective solutions to ecological problems, and exposes the contradiction in the so-called connection between women and nature.

Sturgeon 97 – Professor and Dean of Environmental Studies at York University (Noël, "The Nature of Race: Discourses of Racial Difference in Ecofeminism", Ch. 15 Ecofeminism : Women, Culture, Nature, edited by Karen J Warren, Book) */LEA

In this section, I want to look specifically at the relation of American Indian women to a movement which so far has had predominantly white participants. To say this is not to make invisible all of the feminist environmental activists who are American Indians, several of whom are prominent ecofeminist activists and theorists. But ecofeminism has been primarily a white women's political identification. As I have implied, it does not necessarily follow that the movement cannot be antiracist because it has mostly white participants. It is an important and encouraging phenomenon that white activists take on the responsibility of analyzing racism and acting against it without first requiring that people of color be present in a movement. But much of ecofeminist discourse about Native American women silences their voices even while idealizing them. This process, besides supporting racism, prevents ecofeminists from effectively envisioning solutions to environmental problems. To give a few examples of this discourse, I will use as representative artifacts of U.S. ecofeminism two anthologies, *Healing the Wounds: The Promise of Ecofeminism*, edited by Judith Plant and published by New Society Publishers in 1989 (hereafter HTW) and *Reweaving the World: The Emergence of Ecofeminism*, edited by Irene Diamond and Gloria Orenstein and published by Sierra Club Books in 1990 (hereafter RTW). While there are other important ecofeminist books, and at least two more anthologies recently published, these books are exemplary representatives of the diversity within ecofeminism, the many voices staking out the territory. However, in terms of racial or ethnic identification, this diversity is represented in some problematic ways. HTW has twenty-seven articles whose authors' racial or ethnic identification is as follows: two Native American, one African-American, four Indian (Asian), twenty European-American. RTW has twenty-six articles: one Native American, three African-American, one Indian (Asian), and twenty-one European-American. 26 Again, the fact that European-American women are the most represented authors is not necessarily problematic in itself. But it brings up a question. Why should American Indian cultures, their rituals, beliefs, and practices, be so frequently referenced in the articles written by the European-American women? Native American cultures appear so often in ecofeminist writings because they represent ecological cultures that in some instances can also make claims to relative equality between men and women. The combination seems to be ecofeminist by definition. Furthermore, imagining that American Indian women embody the "special relation" between women and nature at the same time that they are portrayed as representing nonpatriarchal cultures achieves an apparent resolution to one of the major contradictions within ecofeminism which I identified at the start of this chapter. The figure of the Native American woman as the "ultimate ecofeminist" mediates, for white ecofeminists, the conflict between the critique of the patriarchal connection between women and nature and the desire for that very connection. But there has been resistance among American Indian women to being identified as ecofeminist. Winona LaDuke, an Anishinabeg feminist and environmental activist, when asked if she called herself an ecofeminist, stated that while she was glad there was an ecofeminist movement developing, she thought of her activism as stemming from her acculturation as a member of her people. 27 Marie Wilson, a Gitksan woman who is interviewed in HTW, expresses a similar isolation from ecofeminism: "Though I agree with the analysis, the differences must be because of where I come from. In my mind, when I speak about women, I speak about humanity because there is equality in the Gitksan belief: the human is one species broken into two necessary parts, and they are

equal."²⁸ Another uneasiness expressed by Native American women concerns the use of their spirituality within ecofeminism, stemming from the intersection of ecofeminism and New Age feminist spirituality. Though this is only one strand within ecofeminism as a political movement, the use of American Indian rituals and the symbolic positioning of Native American women as white ecofeminists' spiritual teachers comes close to what Andy Smith, a Cherokee woman, has characterized as "spiritual abuse."²⁹ Smith has argued that the use of American Indian spirituality in the New Age movement without a concomitant willingness to get to know Native American communities and become allies of American Indian political struggles constitutes a silencing of Native Americans. Furthermore, generalizing American Indian spirituality to apply it to white ecofeminist concerns violates the very embedment, of spirituality in land and tribe that attracts white ecofeminists. As Smith says, "Indian religions are community-based, not proselytizing religions. For this reason, there is no one Indian religion."³⁰ Given that there are these problems in asking Native American women to identify as ecofeminists, does this mean that ecofeminism cannot learn from American Indians a concept of nature and perhaps, in some cases, examples of more equal relationships between women and men? Why shouldn't ecofeminists, as long as they participate in Native American movements and treat Native American culture with respect, continue to point to the more ecological cosmology, economic practices, and equal social relationships developed by some American Indians? Can ecofeminists use Native American philosophy and practice as resources for constructing theory and creating strategies for action? The problem here lies in the characterization of indigenous people as the "ultimate ecologists," to use Calvin Martin's phrase.³¹ This is a common feature of European-American environmentalism and a legacy of that movement for ecofeminists. Certainly, many Native American conceptions of nature seem to lend themselves to environmentalism in that they generally don't make adversarial distinctions between humans and animals or humans and nature. The sense that life involves constant change within a balanced system and that the interdependence of all living and nonliving beings constitutes the environment seems, in comparison with Western beliefs, to be not only more ecological but also (at least potentially) more feminist. But there are several problems with the valorization of Native American conceptualizations of nature. First, the idea that it is possible to borrow from Native American culture without practicing an American Indian way of life once again does not respect the way in which Native American concepts of nature are embedded in Native American cultural practice. Furthermore, such a conceptualization places American Indians closer to nature in ways which some ecofeminists analyze as being negative for women. To me, these problems are amusingly brought home by a remark made by a Native American man to Judith Plant, who quotes him in her article in HTW. "You and us, we're different," this unnamed Indian man said to Plant, "but we're sort of the same, too. You want to learn to live off this place, we can already do this. You value the salmon, we value the salmon. You don't trust the government, neither do we. Not all Indian people are like us. Not all white people are like you. We're the natives and you're the naturals." At which point, according to Plant, "he roared with laughter." ³² This labeling, this distinction between "natives" and "naturals," is very telling. A "native" is primarily identified with a very specific and fixed area of land □ a "natural" must have a preexisting distinction between culture and nature, and perhaps between civilization and primitivism, in order to "return" to "nature." As long as ecofeminists rely on notions of Native Americans as more naturally ecological, they will present access into Native American cultural practices only through a logic of rejecting culture for nature. Ironically, this theoretical move contains notions of separation between the two concepts which are radically different from much American Indian philosophy. A second problem lies in the dehistoricizing and stereotypical results of the ecofeminist idealization of Native American culture. As the man in Plant's article says, "Not all Indians are like us. Not all white people are like you." Discussions of American Indians as the "ultimate ecologists" tend to generalize across tribal cultures and obscure the specific problems and varied solutions which compound Indian struggles for cultural survival. What happens when Native Americans choose strategies for their struggles which go against ecofeminist political theory and practice? Will they then become "bad Indians" instead of "noble savages"? Marie Wilson expresses this fear when she says: "I have had the awful feeling that when we are finished dealing with the courts and our land claims, we will then have to battle the environmentalists and they will not understand why. I feel quite sick at this prospect because the environmentalists want these beautiful places kept in a state of perfection. ... In a way this is like deny ing that life is happening constantly in these wild places, that change is always occurring. Human life must be there too. Humans have requirements and they are going to have to use some of the life in these places."" ³³ Valorization of the ecological and feminist elements of Native American culture reinvigorates a noble savage stereotype with a dangerous history in this country. Furthermore, the return of the this stereotype creates a conceptual paradox in which ecological and feminist solutions are seen to reside in tribal hunting-and-gathering societies. Because of the way in which the stereotyping of Indian culture prevents knowledge and analysis of the various ways in which Native American tribal cultures have changed, have been both resistant and accommodating to the dominant European-American culture, the noble-savage stereotype brings with it the myth of the "vanished Indian." The "ecological" tribal cultures held up for imitation are thus characterized as either disappearing or preserved in some ideal state. Besides preventing white ecofeminists from really hearing what Native American women think are serious issues in their communities, this characterization creates a stumbling block for ecofeminists trying to imagine solutions to the complexity of contemporary ecological problems. If the only way we can live as ecofeminists is to "return" to a hunting-gathering culture, we cannot begin to inspire people to take action now in the middle of their urban, industrialized, global, environments. If white ecofeminists stopped ideologically separating nature from culture, they would not become tribal peoples—rather, they would be challenged to creatively deal with the politics of their daily technology, their cyborg natures.³⁴ Ecofeminists would have to start imagining nature as including the urban and constructed landscapes in which many of us live. This would put ecofeminists in a position, once again, to ally themselves with antiracist environmental movements that are concentrated on urban problems. Ecofeminists could then share in developing activist strategies that could provide the basis for an effective coalition

politics, not just between white ecofeminists and Native American women environmentalists but across the multitude of differences that divide women. Earlier, I suggested that it is useful to think of the task of ecofeminist theory as developing strategic connections between feminism and environmentalism, rather than between women and nature. The antiracist theories we use are one important link between these political movements. I have argued that ecofeminism inherits a legacy of discourses about racial difference from feminist antimilitarism and white environmentalism that needs to be critically examined if ecofeminism is to be able to create an effective antiracist political strategy. I have identified problems with a binary conception of race and with a valorization of Native American women as the "ultimate ecofeminists." In both cases, I suggest two intertwined approaches to these problems. First, we need to acknowledge and analyze the ways in which U.S. racism operates in multiple arenas, developing a historical understanding of the ways in which racism is reproduced and maintained. Second, I believe that we need to use the antiracist theory developed by people of color to examine the ways in which racism constructs white as well as nonwhite subjects. Otherwise, "women of color" will remain "natural resources" for white ecofeminists rather than feminist environmentalists with whom we can have solidarity in political struggles. These suggestions do not, of course, exhaust the elements necessary for a successful antiracist ecofeminist agenda. 35 But they are one place to start.

WAR BAD

Even if their arguments are true, the aff is still a good idea- women suffer the most from wars which only the aff prevents

Nhanenge, 2007- M.A. in Development Studies from the University of South Africa (Jytte, February 2007, "Ecofeminism: Towards Integrating the Concerns of Women, Poor People, and Nature into Development,"

<http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/570/dissertation.pdf?sequence=1>, Accessed: 7/8/14 FG)

The negative consequences from war are tremendous. In Africa alone, economic losses resulting from wars total 15 billion Euros per year. Such an amount of money could do much social good if spend on poverty alleviation. Instead, the investments are causing horrendous human losses. During the 1990's an estimated 5 million people died in violent conflicts.

Of the total number of people killed in conflicts since the end of the Cold War, 90% were civilians. Half of these are children.

Of all civilians killed in wars, 90% die at the hands of small firearms. The Congo war was the deadliest since the 2nd World War. 1,000 people died every day. Half of them were children. 4 million people died during the last 6 years, 98% of these died from diseases and malnutrition. In 1994, UNICEF issued a report on the effects that wars and conflicts have on children in the world: During the decade 1984-1994 2 million children died, 4 to 5 million were disabled, 5 million became refugees and 12 million children were made homeless. Over 300,000 children under the age of 18 years serve in armies or in armed gangs. Some are as young as 8 years. A 2006 report from Save the Children adds that 43 million children are unable to go to school because of conflicts and wars. (Rowe 1997: 241; Ode September 2004: 11; BBC News 10.12.2004; BBC News 12.09.2006). According to Heyzer, (1995: 13)

war is a gender-differentiated activity of which women are the worst victims. Violence against women during war is common. They are being used, abused and mistreated in wars. The cumulated effects give significant difficulties for women. It generates physical and psychological suffering and gives obstacles for women's individual growth, their self-worth and their ability to participate in society. In wars, **there is** consequently **no victory for women, no**

matter which side wins. (Heyzer 1995: 13; Rowe 2000: 369). Rape is routinely viewed as a privilege of victors in war. During the mid to late 1990s, mass military rapes of women and children in Rwanda, Somalia, Croatia, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina were common knowledge. According to human rights, organization rape was used as an instrument of policy by Serbian forces and paramilitary groups in both Kosovo and Bosnia. Rape was also official policy for the Hutus when they attacked their Tutsi neighbours in Rwanda in 1994. Similar policy is currently applied in the Darfur region of Sudan. It is extremely difficult to quantify wartime rape. The estimates vary widely. In former Yugoslavia, the figures are estimates to be between 11,900 and 20,000 victims. However, **the systematic rape of women by the Hutus in Rwanda amounts to hundreds of thousands of women, most of who were murdered. Children were raped along with their mothers. It was also official policy to infect the women with Aids. The idea was to let them live so that they would infect Tutsi men before they died.** Even though rape during war was recognized in 1995 as a prosecutable war crime, the military rape continues. (BBC News December 2005; Rowe 2000: 371; Warren 2000: 208-209).

NO ALT

There's no alternative – lack of theory and plethora of contradictions ensures failure

Mills, 91 – Associate Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst (Patricia, "Feminism and Ecology: On the Domination of Nature," Ecological Feminist Philosophies, Indiana University Press, pp. 220-221 – edited by Karen Warren)//schnall

While I agree with King's assessment of Daly and Griffin, I find that her "arguments" remain rhetorical and polemical, so that this later work is no more sophisticated in its analysis and no closer to the "precise political philosophy and program" that she calls for than is her earlier piece. King's programmatic plundering of theories (the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, Bookchin's anarchism, socialist feminism, radical cultural feminism), which is meant to bolster the political project of ecofeminism, remains rooted in an abstract pro-nature stance that continues to call for theory but rarely provides it. She tells us over and over again that we must have a "truly dialectical theory" and a "reconciliation with nature" in order to "get beyond dualism," but she refuses the difficult conceptual work that might get us there. King's concern is first and foremost one of political practice—theory is the handmaid of practice for her, as feminism is the handmaid of the ecology movement. In her search for the dialectical praxis that is to point the way to freedom, King refers to the important political work done by the women's health movement in the West to rescue childbirth from "medical experts," thereby reclaiming women's power over our bodies and our lives. But even as she reclaims a focus on women's procreational power she again fails to delineate a politics of abortion, offering no principle for grounding the feminist struggle for reproductive freedom.¹³ She also cites "the hugging movement" initiated by women in India who wrap themselves around trees to prevent the destruction of their forests. These two movements represent the "nonoppositional opposition" that is the foundation of King's ecofeminist politics.

When King does turn to theory, she offers a critique of what she sees as the three dominant forms of feminism (liberal feminism, radical feminism, and socialist feminism) in terms of the problem of the domination of nature. What she then puts forward as a "solution" is an ecofeminism that is said to be a dialectical "synthesis" of radical cultural feminism and socialist feminism.¹⁴ According to King this synthesis offers a "standpoint theory"¹⁵ that recognizes biological difference and recognizes women as unique historical agents who do the mediating work ("mothering, cooking, healing, farming, foraging") that bridges the relation between nature and culture (1989, 130). While critical of radical cultural feminism for its biological determinism, King argues that it has at least recognized the importance of "natural" sexual difference for the social world (1989, 129). And although King is critical of socialist feminism for its Marxist inclination to maintain the domination of nature and the social construction of reality (to the detriment of the qualitative, imaginative, and spiritual aspects of human life), she sees it as offering a resistance to the erasure of the subject by postmodernism. Beginning from the gynocentrism of radical cultural feminism we are to move to a "greener" and more "spiritual" socialist feminism that recants the domination of nature. According to King, "Separately [socialist feminism and radical cultural feminism] perpetuate the dualism of 'mind' and 'nature.' Together they make possible a new ecological relationship between nature and culture, in which mind and nature, heart and reason, join forces to transform the internal and external systems of domination that threaten the existence of life on earth" (1989, 132). Just how is this dialectical "synthesis" of socialist feminism and radical cultural feminism to take place? Is this merely another form of neo-Hegelianism that is being called for? It seems so, insofar as King calls for a dialectical reconciliation of opposites in a final moment of identity-in-difference. If King's ecofeminism is just another form of neo-Hegelianism, then the fact that Hegel's philosophy remains committed to the domination of nature and all that is deemed Other prevents the realization of her project. If this is not a form of neo-Hegelianism, then how are we to understand King's project in which we are to take only what King deems "good" from each form of feminism while leaving aside what is "bad"? Without a more profound analysis of the contradictions that emerge out of the confrontation between these two forms of feminism, the call for their synthesis remains conceptually incoherent. It returns us to the problem of extracting parts from the whole, which was shown to be treacherous in my earlier critique of Balbus.

2AC PERMUTATION

The perm solves best- ecofeminist principles can help inform policy choices

Ellinger-Locke, 2010- Lawyer with a B.A. in Ecofeminism from Antioch College (Maggie, "Food Sovereignty is a Gendered Issue," Published in the Buffalo Environmental Law Journal, Accessed in Lexis FG)

Like feminism, ecological feminism or "ecofeminism," has many definitions. As discussed here, ecofeminism is considered the study of the oppression of women, the study of the degradation of the Earth, how they are interrelated and, more importantly, what steps can be taken to change this situation. ⁿ¹⁴⁸ Ecofeminist theory and practice, or praxis, have been linking these twin systems of power for years, and it appears that La Vía Campesina and other social movements have also made the connection. While certainly not without serious criticism, ecofeminism can provide policy and law makers with the tools needed to reform the food system. Ecofeminist and law professor Heather McLeod-Kilmurray states that "[f]eminist legal analysis has shown that the framework and underlying concepts of law have tended to be part of the problem rather than the solution in resolving inequality and discrimination... an ecofeminist analysis can do the same for environmental law." ⁿ¹⁴⁹ Another ecofeminist legal scholar, Elaine Hughes, explains the purpose of ecofeminism: "ecofeminists take the radical feminist critique of male/female relationships and use it to illuminate the character of human/nature relationships. In so doing, they reveal both the causes and characteristics of, and the interconnections between, the objectification of women and the environment." ⁿ¹⁵⁰ There are two main and one emerging branch of ecofeminism. The first is the cultural branch embraced by such activists as Starhawk and exemplified by the women's action at the Pentagon in 1980. ⁿ¹⁵¹ These ecofeminists believe that the [*188] women/nature connection is a good thing, something to be valued and honored. They see women's differences as sources of power and believe that women are closer to the earth than men. ⁿ¹⁵² The second main branch is social ecofeminism that rejects the essentialism of the cultural ecofeminist approach, arguing that viewing women as so connected to nature is dangerous and reinscribes the power dynamics that feminists seek to escape. ⁿ¹⁵³ Both of these branches have been critiqued by poor women and women of color as not being inclusive enough of their identities and experiences. ⁿ¹⁵⁴ Thus, the emerging third way, as exemplified by third wave feminism, takes these analyses into account and rejects the privileging of one identity over the others. ⁿ¹⁵⁵ Third wave ecofeminism embraces strategic uses of essentialism ⁿ¹⁵⁶ for the purposes of organizing, and recognizes how careful one must be in this regard. Third wave ecofeminism is an approach that, if embraced, will mitigate the damage being wrought across the globe to women, children, and all living things. For example, Vandana Shiva is representative of this new approach. She writes: The feminist perspective is able to go beyond the categories of patriarchy that structure power and meaning in nature and society. It is broader and deeper because it locates production and consumption within the context of regeneration... [*189] by making these links, ecological feminism creates the possibility of viewing the world as an active subject, not merely a resource to be manipulated and appropriated... That search and experience of interdependence and integrity is the basis for creating a science and knowledge that nurtures rather than violates nature's sustainable systems. ⁿ¹⁵⁷ [emphasis in original] Applying a feminist lens to the global food system illuminates the unequal power dynamics inherent in the current global food system, both in terms of production and consumption. Using the ecofeminist principles of food sovereignty can provide guidance towards constructing new policy proposals for law makers and regulators.

Perm do both- uniting masculine and feminine mindsets solves the aff and causes a mindset shift like the alternative suggests

Nhanenge, 2007- M.A. in Development Studies from the University of South Africa (Jytte, February 2007, "Ecofeminism: Towards Integrating the Concerns of Women, Poor People, and Nature into Development,"

<http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/570/dissertation.pdf?sequence=1>, Accessed: 7/8/14 FG)

The one-sided yang evolution has now reached a highly alarming stage: Modern society can control spacecrafts landing on distant planets, but they cannot control pollution from cars and factories. They produce little essential products like cosmetics and tinned pet food, but they cannot afford to provide people with basic health and education facilities. Science was meant to improve life, but its intrusive technology and its focus on economic profit endangers natural and human health and generates poverty. In addition, paradoxically, most "defence" ministries have become the greatest threat to national security! This is the result of overemphasizing the yang or masculine side and neglecting the yin or feminine side. (Capra 1982: 26). In reality, the mechanistic scientific paradigm has gone bankrupt. This means that also the modern culture is collapsing. And according to Henderson, a collapse is a legitimate and proper behaviour under the circumstances. She refers to Thomas Kuhn who points out in his book "Structure of Scientific Revolutions" that a major paradigm shift leads to a major cultural shift. The modern world is consequently faced with an inevitable social, political and economic transition. Although such a change may be painful, Henderson finds that there is a yin-yang rebirth ready to flower. (Henderson 1978: 17, 329, 400). The focus on yang is in opposition to the Chinese philosophy of change, where the masculine yang and the

feminine yin are complimentary and in a dynamic balance. Hence, modern patriarchy destroyed the necessary yin-yang balance. Due to the extent and size of the current crises, it has become a biological survival to reintegrate both. Hence, for Capra, Birkeland and Henderson the solution is that yang must allow the re-emergence of yin to restore balance. Both modes of cognition are equally important thus both need to be reintegrated. **It is** therefore **time to reunite** reason and emotion; rationality and intuition; head and heart; mind and body; people and nature; analysis and synthesis; **the public and the private;** men and women **in order to create harmony**. This should give a universal balance and a rich, new intellectual insight in reality.

According to the Chinese philosophy yang cannot go on forever without self-destruction. Thus having reached its climax, yang must retreat in favour of yin. Both Henderson and Capra believe that this retreat is manifested in the ever-increasing global movements the world is witnessing promoting counter-cultures, counter-economies, peace, gender-equality and ecological sustainability. They mark the reversal to the yin and hence manifest what both call "the turning point". As Henderson says, "The old instrumental yang is now turning into a re-emergence of the subtler yin, intuitive consciousness, to restore the balance". This metaphor, of the return to a dynamic balance between yin and yang, is parallel to what Western feminists are advocating. (Henderson 1978: 15-17, 330, 384, 400; Capra 1982: 30; Birkeland 1995: 56). Thus, the yang phase of modern culture can find many correctives in Eastern thought. The notion of yin and yang are offering real opportunities of nuancing and subtilising modern harshness and balancing its antagonism. The Eastern ideas serve to remind the modern world of things that have been forgotten or have gone stale in its tradition, and to bring new life to them. There was in the West a contemplative tradition, and people were pondering things in their hearts. This figure of contemplation has in the modern culture always been feminine. Contemplation and meditative wisdom are therefore needed for the recovery of the yin, for receptive inner growth against external manipulation and organisation. The way of the Tao is to be leaning back receptively on the wisdom that is inherent in nature. There is often more wisdom in the human body than in the human mind. The self is so much more and so much wiser than an abstracted pure intellect. (Versfeld 1979: 68-70).

Perm solves – combination of criticism and policy action key

Lahar, 91 – Academic Dean at Woodbury College, is a founding member and former chair of the Burlington Conservation Board (Stephanie, "Ecofeminist Theory and Grassroot Politics," *Ecological Feminist Philosophies*, Indiana University Press, pp. 8-9 – edited by Karen Warren)//schnall

Maintaining a balance of critical and creative directions is crucial to the continued political potency of ecofeminism. Can we afford not to have an action-oriented philosophy at a crisis point in social and natural history, when we are literally threatened on a global scale by annihilation by nuclear war or ecological destruction? Ecofeminism's promise is that it provides not only an orientation and worldview but also a basis for responsible action. In order for the movement to fulfill this promise, I believe that it is necessary to establish broad parameters that diverse ideas and actions can be referred to, and to maintain critical and vitalizing links between theory and praxis. I offer the following four points of focus to help create and maintain a firm ground for social and ecological responsibility and political participation. These are that WE (1) treat ecofeminism as a moral theory, (2) engage in the project of working out an integrated philosophy of humanity and nonhuman nature, (3) view this theory as a living process inseparable from the individuals and groups who think and practice it, and (4) maintain an active political and participatory emphasis that is both deconstructive (reactive to current injustices) and reconstructive (proactive in creating new forms of thinking and doing). The first parameter I have outlined is that ecofeminism be treated as a moral theory—a prescriptive psychological and social model that includes an idea of future potential and how best to unfold it, not just an analysis of how things were in the past or are currently. Philosopher Amélie Rorty defines such a theory and what it should do: Besides characterizing the varieties of well-lived lives, and formulating general principles and ideals for regulating conduct, a moral theory should tell us something about how to get from where we are to where we might better be. While it needn't prescribe a decision procedure for determining every detail of every choice and action, it should, in a general way, be action-guiding: constructing a robust ethical theory requires an astute understanding of psychology and of history. (1988,15; italics added) Furthermore, a moral theory must emerge out of a felt sense of need and personal connection with the issues at hand, not just out of an abstract process of reasoning. Ethical systems based only in abstracted values fail to draw real commitments and can too easily be used as tools of manipulation and deception—for example, to rationalize military aggression on the basis of furthering democracy. Ecofeminism must be adequately grounded and contextualized to be a "robust" and action-guiding ethical theory. It should, therefore, have a foundational characterization of reality (an ontology) and escape some of the traps of classical philosophy that have helped to support conceptual splitting and dualisms. In particular, ecofeminism needs to avoid assumptions of either classical materialism or classical idealism, with connotations of inanimate substance set in opposition to a

purely subjective, psychic, or spiritual quality. This means that we must develop concepts and personal sensibilities of self and world that move beyond conceptual dichotomies. Our paradigms and experiences of self and world must be monistic but differentiated to reflect their real basis in earthly life, accounting for both the integrity of individuals and collective realities and functions.

perm do both: scientific ecology and ecofeminism are compatible through their ecosystem hierarchy theory

Warren 97 – Chair of Philosophy at Macalester College (Karen, “Scientific Ecology and Ecological Feminism: The Potential for Dialogue”, Ch. 19 Ecofeminism : Women, Culture, Nature, Book) */LEA

while ecofeminism and scientific ecology both endeavor to understand nature, ecofeminists work toward an understanding of the social context of nature—the metaphors used to describe nature, society's attitudes toward nature, the relationship between nature and women, and how that relationship has been exploited to subordinate nature and women. Ecology as a science embraces a mechanistic, materialist, reductionist approach to studying nature. The questions asked and the methods of answering them fall within standards set by the scientific community. And as with most sciences, self-reflection and an understanding of its social context are not goals of traditional ecological science. This leaves little inherent overlap in the two fields' goals and approaches to studying nature. Warren and Cheney's analysis of the meeting point of ecofeminism and ecology delves deeper than my analysis, and they find as common ground for these two disparate fields the ideology expressed in ecosystem hierarchy theory (as outlined by O'Neill et al., 1986). Simply put, both ecofeminism and ecosystem hierarchy theory are engaged in the challenge of valuing multiple voices to inform their projects. With feminism, the goal is to incorporate the diversity of women's voices into a richly textured tapestry. Likewise in scientific ecology, the complexity of interactions and processes presents the ecologist with the challenge of integrating "voices" from multiple data sets. More specifically, Warren and Cheney identify ten similarities between the goals of hierarchy theory and those of ecofeminism, including the understanding of context- dependent reference points□ an appreciation of alternative reference points and alternative data sets□ an antireductionist, inclusivist approach that centralizes diversity by recognizing and appreciating the unique contributions of alternative data sets□ and a recognition of the autonomous and relational existence of individuals. Warren and Cheney draw parallels between the recognition by O'Neill et al. that alternative spatial and temporal scales yield different data sets and the ecofeminist goal of integrating multiple perspectives on ecological and feminist issues.

WATER WARS TURNS ECOFEM

Accessibility to water disproportionately affects women

Warren, oo – feminist philosopher, pioneer ecofeminist, former Professor and Chair of Philosophy at Macalester College (Karen, “Ecofeminist Philosophy: A Western Perspective on What It Is and Why It Matters,” Rowman & Littlefield, [//schnall](http://www.uvm.edu/rsenr/nr6/Readings/Warren_ecofeminism_article.pdf)

WOMEN, WATER, AND DROUGHT The demand for water for agricultural irrigation in developing countries accounted for 30 percent of the growth in water consumption in 1990. World water use is divided among irrigation uses (73 percent), industry uses (22 per- cent), and domestic uses (5 percent). But less than 3 percent of all water on earth is fresh. The atmosphere, rivers, streams, lakes, and underground stores hold less than 1 percent of the earth's water. Furthermore, millions of humans have difficulty getting sufficient water necessary for survival, about 5 liters per day. In more than half of the developing countries, less than 50 percent of the population has a source of potable water or facilities for sewage disposal. The World Health Organization estimates that approximately 85 percent of all sicknesses and diseases in developing countries, including diarrhea, trachoma, parasitic worms, and malaria, are attributable to inadequate potable water or sanitation. It also estimates that as many as 25 million deaths a year are due to water-related illnesses. The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) estimates that 15 million children die every year before they are five; half of them could be saved if they had access to safe drinking water. Water scarcity is of special concern for women and children. According to The World's Women, 1995, the majority of countries in Africa and many countries of Asia and Latin America are considered water-scarcity countries. In these countries, women and children perform most of the water collection work. Small-scale studies in Africa and Asia indicate that women and girls spend up to forty-three hours per week collecting and carrying water (e.g., in Africa, approximately seventeen hours in Senegal, five hours in rural areas of Botswana, and forty-three hours on northern farms in Ghana; in Asia, seven hours in the Baroda region of India, one to five hours in Nepalese villages, depending on the ages of the girls, and three hours in Pakistan) . Because of natural resource depletion, women also must walk farther for water (e.g., up to fifteen kilometers daily through rough terrain in Uttarakhand, India). The effects on women in these countries is significant: The proportion of rural women affected by water scarcity is estimated at 55 per cent in Africa, 32 per cent in Asia and 45 per cent in Latin America. Even where water is abundant overall in countries, there still are significant parts of many countries where at least seasonal water scarcity burdens women with added time for water collection. According to Joni Seager, approximately half the population in the Third World is still without safe drinking water. There are 250 million cases of water- related diseases, resulting in ten million deaths, reported each year. Drinking water is often drawn from public bathing and laundering places, and the same water is frequently used as a public toilet. Lack of sanitary water is of special concern for women and children since, as the primary providers of household water, they experience disproportionately higher health risks in the presence of unsanitary water. Contaminated water and its disproportionate effects on women, particularly among people of color and the poor, is not just a problem in developing countries. In 1980, the United States produced 125 billion pounds of hazardous waste, enough to fill approximately 3,000 Love Canals. By the mid-1990s, 38 percent of the rivers in the United States were too polluted to swim in. Groundwater, the drinking water source for nearly half of the population of the United States, is contaminated by leaking chemical wastes and other substances. As an example, in Hardeman County, Tennessee, in 1964, the Velsicol Chemical Company dumped 300,000 fifty-five gallon barrels of unknown chemicals on their 242-acre farm. Some of the barrels burst open, and their contents seeped into the soil. In 1967 a U.S. Geological Survey report showed that the chemicals from the dump site were reaching local water wells. No action was taken. By 1977 residents noticed that their drinking water had a foul odor and taste. Nell Grantham, a licensed practical nurse, took samples of their water for testing. The results confirmed their suspicions: Their water contained harmful chemicals, twelve clearly identified. Local residents were told the water was not safe to drink, cook with, bathe in; vegetables and animals could not be raised on their land. Residents experienced a host of health problems: skin rashes, liver damage, birth defects. A different sort of water issue that affects women, people of color, the poor, and children are the so-called natural disasters of droughts and floods. A drought is too little water; a flood is too much water. Traditionally, droughts and floods are considered "disasters" only when humans, human communities, and property have been seriously affected. Humans make land more drought-prone and more flood-prone

(and, hence, more disaster-prone) by removing the vegetation and soil systems that absorb and store water. As Anders Wijkman and Lloyd Timberlake claim about droughts, "reduced rainfall may trigger a drought, but human pressure on the land is the primary cause." Wijkman and Timberlake argue that forces of nature ("natural events") trigger disaster events, but they are not the main cause. In the developing world, they identify three main causes of "natural disasters": human vulnerability resulting from poverty and inequality; environmental degradation owing to poor land use; and rapid population growth, especially among the poor. But these three main causes involve a complex set of institutional, economic, cultural, and political factors. According to Wijkman and Timberlake, these complex factors bear an important and typically undernoticed causal role in the occurrence of "natural disasters," such as droughts and floods, that affect millions of humans and animals. Economic or class interests head the list of human-induced factors that affect the occurrences and locations of droughts as "natural disasters." Wijkman and Timberlake poignantly express this point when they claim that "no wealthy person ever died in a drought," "no relief worker has starved to death during a drought," and "no journalist has died of hunger while covering a drought." Are droughts and floods--obvious environmental issues with class implications-also gender and age issues? Yes, especially considering that it is poor women and children who are most significantly affected. This is due to a constellation of interconnected factors--with poverty a major factor. No matter how poverty is measured, the poor population is largely and increasingly comprised of women and children. Poverty differentials among both groups are magnified by race, ethnicity, and age. For example, cross-culturally, women are paid less than men, and women in most regions spend as much or more time working than men when unpaid housework is taken into account. Women everywhere control fewer resources and reap a lesser share of the world's wealth than men: Women do more than one-half of the world's work, but receive only 10 percent of the world's income and own only 1 percent of the world's property. Women-headed households are a growing worldwide phenomenon, with between 80 and 90 percent of poor families headed by women. When one remembers that the three elements that make up the major part of Third World disasters are deforestation, desertification, and soil erosion, and that, among humans, it is the poor who are most significantly affected by them, one can then understand why women and children will be disproportionately victims of these disasters.

“MOTHER EARTH”

“Mother Earth” serves to further separate women from society – dehumanization

Roach, 96 – Professor of New College Affiliated Faculty in Dept. of Gender and Race Studies (Catherine, “Loving your Mother: On the Women-Nature Connection,” *Ecological Feminist Philosophies*, Indiana University Press, pp. 56-57 – edited by Karen Warren)//schnall

A second way we can look at the woman-nature link is to ask not just how nature is affected by its association with motherhood but

how women are affected by their association with nature. The "Love Your Mother" slogan helps perpetuate the idea that women are closer to nature and, implicitly, that men are closer to culture. Here I use traditional Western definitions of culture as "that which is human or made by humans" and nature as "that which is not human nor made by humans."⁵ Much work has been done in feminist and

ecofeminist theory to document how women have traditionally been perceived as closer to nature and men as closer to culture and how women in patriarchal culture have suffered from these perceptions.

Sherry Ortner, Colette Guillaumin, Dorothy Dinnerstein, Carolyn Merchant, Elizabeth Dodson Gray, Susan Griffin, and others have all contributed to our understanding of these points. The basic argument is that in patriarchal culture, when women are seen as closer to nature than men, women are inevitably seen as less fully human than men.

Susan Griffin, for example, in her passionate and poetic book *Woman and Nature: The Roaring Inside Her* (1978) juxtaposes negative comments about women with those about nature in order to illustrate how the two are perceived to be on an equal and

lowly plane quite outside the properly human (that is, the male). In a series of evocative chapters Griffin shows how this association, as it has functioned in patriarchal culture, has contributed to women's voicelessness and powerlessness by assigning woman the roles of passive and obedient reproducer and nurturer (in

her chapter entitled "Cows"), obstinate and dull-witted drudge, bred for labor the breeders do not wish to do (in the "Mules" chapter), and well-trained and well-groomed gratifier of her master (in "The Show Horse" chapter). One way to put this point about

the woman-nature connection is to say that in patriarchal culture nature is overpersonified and women are underpersonified. Women are perceived to merge with nature, to be part of the nonhuman

surround and only semihuman. Similarly, nature is perceived as female, as virgin resource to be exploited or raped, as sharing in woman's semihuman quality. Women are perceived "as a natural resource,"

Dinnerstein says, "as an asset to be owned and harnessed, harvested and mined, with no fellow-feeling for her depletion and no responsibility for her conservation or replenishment" (1976, 36-37).

Even when women are exalted as purer than men, as less bestial, and as the "guardians of culture and morals,"

Ortner points out that these seeming "inversions" merely place women "above" instead of "below"

culture and that women are still in both cases excluded from the realm of culture (1974, 86).

[end card here]

ECOFEM= ANTHRO

Ecofeminism is anthropocentric – focuses on the connection between women and the environment

King, 91 – Department of Philosophy, University of Maine (Roger, “Caring about Nature: Feminist Ethics and the Environment,” Ecological Feminist Philosophies, Indiana University Press, pp. 89 – edited by Karen Warren)//schnall

What this suggests, however, is that the essentialist ecofeminist project is primarily anthropocentric, that is, oriented to the welfare of human beings. Ecofeminism, like feminism more generally conceived, is first and foremost a political movement against the forces of patriarchy that harm and oppress women. The ecological insight is that the oppression of women takes on an ecological dimension in contemporary industrial society through the augmented effects of environmental degradation on the well-being of women. But this ecological insight does not entail any turn toward nature in its own right. The anthropocentrism of the essentialists' environmental stance is evident in Lee Quinby's comment about "the significance of ecofeminism as resistance politics": Struggling against specific sites of power not only weakens the junctures of power's networks but also empowers those who do the struggling. Two recent books [Caldecott and Leland (1983) and Garland (1988)] show, for example, how contamination of women's wombs and breast milk leads to struggle against chemical dumping; how compromises to our immunity systems, which render our bodies vulnerable to a whole host of viruses that formerly we could withstand, lead to challenges against late-capitalist food industries and the practices of Western medicine; how logging practices in India lead to women there struggling against the multinational destruction of the culture ... Such episodes of activism show how feminism's struggle for women's freedom and ecology's struggle for planetary well-being have come together in an alliance called ecofeminism. (Quinby 1990, 124)

ECOFEM FAILS

Radical ecofeminism reciprocates dualisms of patriarchy and environment

King, 91 – Department of Philosophy, University of Maine (Roger, “Caring about Nature: Feminist Ethics and the Environment,” Ecological Feminist Philosophies, Indiana University Press, pp. 89 – edited by Karen Warren)//schnall

In speaking of radical feminism's contribution to ecofeminism, Carolyn Merchant also points to the same kinds of concern. The link between women and biological reproduction leads ecofeminists to address the consequences of nuclear radiation, toxic wastes, household chemicals, pesticides, and herbicides for women's reproductive organs, for pregnant women, and for children. But as she also notes, "A politics grounded in women's culture, experience, and values can be seen as reactionary" (1990, 102). The essentialist strand of ecofeminism paradoxically makes the strongest claims about the connection between women's lived experience and environmental care while at the same time replicating the dualisms of patriarchal thinking. Essentialist, or radical, ecofeminism reproduces the dualism between what counts morally and what does not. It sets up an essential opposition between male and female natures, and its logic reveals an equally dualistic perception of nature, dividing it into those aspects that impinge on women's well-being and those that do not. The "lived experience" of women, to which the essentialist ecofeminist appeals in formulating her environmental ethics of care, is as parochial as the "lived experience" of men that ecofeminists find so unpalatable in deep ecology and in arguments for hunting (Kheel 1990).⁵ There is nothing in the logic of the essentialists' environmental ethics that entails a care for the wilderness and its inhabitants, for example, that is not ultimately self-referential. It is this constant return to the welfare of human beings as the standard of moral evaluation that deep ecologists such as Warwick Fox criticize as anthropocentric (Fox 1989, 25). The conceptualist strand of ecofeminism, on the other hand, is critical of the dualism and the essentialism of radical feminism. In this view, the vocabulary of ... conceived as moral agents, right holders, interest carriers, or sentient beings)" (Warren 1990, 135).

Conceptualist ecofeminism fails – lived experience selective

King, 91 – Department of Philosophy, University of Maine (Roger, “Caring about Nature: Feminist Ethics and the Environment,” Ecological Feminist Philosophies, Indiana University Press, pp. 92 – edited by Karen Warren)//schnall

The conceptualist use of the vocabulary of care is an advance on that of the essentialist because it avoids the latter's anthropocentric orientation and the accompanying dualism. Nonetheless, there are two concerns that I think need to be raised even here. First, lived experience is selective in that it results from cultural, as well as personal, interpretation of experience. Many people lack any concrete awareness of the workings of the environment and do not care very deeply about the fate of nonhuman beings and systems. But if this is so, then any reliance on lived experience and personal narrative as a basis for constructing a moral perspective in environmental ethics presupposes some reconstruction or education of lived experience that is not intrinsic to that experience itself. Warren notes that first-person narrative "provides a way of conceiving of ethics and ethical meaning as emerging out of particular situations moral agents find themselves in, rather than as being imposed on those situations . . . This emergent feature of narrative centralizes the importance of voice" (Warren 1990, 136). But whose voice should we be listening to: the resort developer's, the agribusiness entrepreneur's, the hunter's, the tourist's, the weekend athlete's? These voices are not all compatible with one another, nor are they all interested in the well-being of the natural world. It might be argued that the importance of personal narrative is not simply that it gives voice to a moral relationship to nature, but that it may be a vehicle for expressing and producing a caring relationship to the environment. Narratives might give evidence of, and create, caring relationships while bypassing the abstract question of whether the partners in the relationship

"deserve" their moral standing. But we must still ask which narratives express this caring relationship; which narratives should we listen to and respect? Our choice of narratives will be grounded in a prior moral understanding of human relationships with the natural world. Therefore, any particular narrative of lived experience can only become a basis for moral reflection and conduct as a part of a general interpretation and understanding of nature and its moral standing.⁶ If this is so, then we cannot give uncritical credence to the view that normative force emerges from the personal narratives of lived experience. This points to the need to concretize and particularize the reference to lived experience in order to avoid yet another abstract ethics. My second concern about the conceptualist position is that to see the importance of personal narrative in an ecofeminist ethics of care is not yet to know what it means to care about nature. Indeed, Warren's own narrative reveals some of the difficulties here. Care in her narrative appears to be a subjective feeling linked to her awareness of the sights and sounds around her and her feelings of serenity. She suddenly feels "as if the rock and I were silent conversational partners in a longstanding friendship." However, the narrative does not clarify in what sense the climber and the rock were either conversational partners or friends, since no voice is given to the rock in the narrative. The rock is personified as a partner and friend, yet it merely submits silently to being climbed upon, giving unilaterally what the climber wants. In this particular narrative, therefore, the concepts of "conversational partner" and "friendship," as well as their moral significance, remain unexplicated.

Conceptualist ecofeminism too dependent on "caring"

King, 91 – Department of Philosophy, University of Maine (Roger, "Caring about Nature: Feminist Ethics and the Environment," *Ecological Feminist Philosophies*, Indiana University Press, pp. 92 – edited by Karen Warren)//schnall

Warren's narrative does not clarify what care means or what its moral significance is. She contrasts a climber who cares about the rock with one who seeks to conquer it, yet for the rock, it is all the same thing: **the rock does not care**. Indeed, the fact that the climber cares for the rock appears to have no practical consequences for the rock itself. What, then, is gained by the metaphors of conversation, partnership, and friendship when these are taken out of their human context and when the only speaker and ultimate beneficiary is still the human climber? I have indicated in this section how both the essentialist and conceptualist strands of ecofeminism make use of the vocabulary of an ethics of care. While the conceptualist strategy avoids the problems associated with essentialism, it is still open to the objection that it relies too heavily on "lived experience" and an indeterminate conception of caring. If an ethics of care is to have moral significance for ecofeminism, some account of care needs to be given that shows how nature itself benefits from human care. We need not argue that the object of care reciprocate or acknowledge the care we extend to it.⁷ Nonetheless, if care has no practical implications for the welfare of the one who is cared for, then it would seem to be little more than a subjective sense of aesthetic appreciation, with no particular moral importance.

PERMS – FOR K AFFS

ANTHRO

Perm do both- raises awareness the best

Warren 97 – Chair of Philosophy at Macalester College (Karen, “Androcentrism and Anthropocentrism: Parallels and Politics”, Ch. 20 Ecofeminism : Women, Culture, Nature, Book) */LEA

Feminist and ecofeminist exposure of masculinism in environmental thinking is sometimes portrayed as carping, purely critical and negative. This portrait overlooks not only the role of feminist criticism in developing a better theory but also the positive theoretical improvements feminist theory can bring to environmental thought as it applies feminist models and understandings to the core

concepts of environmental philosophy. In this chapter I argue that the sophisticated understanding of androcentrism which has emerged from feminism can help resolve some problems with the key concept of anthropocentrism which threaten the foundations of environmental philosophy. Since

women differ from individual to individual and are oppressed in multiple ways, a commitment to ending the subordination of all women implies that feminism must address itself to many forms of oppression and attempt to theorize some of the connections between them (Jaggar 1994).

consequently some forms of feminist theory have been led to develop a more general account of what

I will call centrism, which discerns a common centric structure underlying different forms of oppression (Hartsock 1990). Since ecofeminism insists that feminism must address not only the forms of oppression which afflict humans but also those that afflict nature, the extension of feminist insights and models of centrism to illuminate problems in the concept of anthropocentrism is a core concern of the ecofeminist theoretical project. These insights from a feminist account of centrism can also, as

I argue in the last part of this chapter, cast some valuable light on how we are able, as ecofeminists, to speak for nature. Concepts of centrism have been at the heart of modern liberation politics and theory. Feminism has focused on androcentrism, phallogocentrism, and phallogocentrism as theoretical refinements of its central concept of sexism□ it has also focused on the connection between these and other forms of centrism. Antiracist theory critiques ethnocentrism, movements against European colonization critique Eurocentrism, gay and lesbian activists critique heterocentrism, and so on. The Green movement's flagship in this liberation armada has been the notion of anthropocentrism, or human-centeredness. The critique of anthropocentrism, however, unlike the other critiques of centrism, continues to be denied legitimacy in many quarters, including some Green quarters, and its usefulness to the Green movement is under challenge. After two decades of intensive debate in ecophilosophy over the concept, the discussion seems to be irretrievably bogged down in largely repetitious argument between two opposing camps. The concept of anthropocentrism, which is so powerfully defended by some as the heart of environmental philosophy, continues to be seen by others as subject to fatal objection and fit only for the dustbin. William Grey (1993) is just the latest of those who declare the search for a nonanthropocentric ethic to be "a hopeless quest." The critique of anthropocentrism has been almost the defining task of

ecophilosophy, whose characteristic general thesis has been that our frameworks of morality and rationality must be expanded to include the welfare of at least certain categories of

nonhumans□ stopping these frameworks at the human species boundary is considered anthropocentric. But beyond this point of agreement, ecophilosophy is deeply divided as to how best to accomplish this expansion and how far it should go□ according to its critics, it is suffering from what Andrew Dobson has called "the failure to make itself practical" (1990, 70). What Dobson means by this is that ecophilosophy, as articulated by the thinkers he considers—mainly deep ecologists—may give personal uplift but appears to provide little help with practical Green action, strategy, or politics. To the extent that the theory it has developed proscribes as anthropocentric all prudential types of argument which adduce ill consequences for humans from current environmental practices and attitudes, it seems to run counter to the practical politics of environmental activism. But abandonment of the critique of anthropocentrism is also problematic, since its demise not only threatens the loss of the major revolutionary insights of environmental thought but also appears to threaten the claim to autonomy of the Green movement and the independence of its intellectual critique. So a major impasse seems to confront the foundations of environmental philosophy—abandon the core critique and risk absorption and co-optation into other movements (such as ecosocial-ism, which is waiting in the wings) or try to struggle on with an embattled central concept which seems to be finding little support. Those who continue to believe that the concept of anthropocentrism is fundamental to the Green critique (and I count myself among them) have a number of alternatives open to them in the face of this seemingly implacable resistance to its core concept. We could interpret the embattled nature of this core concept as showing that this form of centrism is more fiercely defended and perhaps deeper and more resistant to change than the other forms. We could point to its far-reaching implications and note that those who fail to see its relevance, and indeed those to whom the case must be put as well as those who must articulate it, are from the group which, in terms of other liberatory critiques, corresponds to the oppressor class. But an alternative (or additional) hypothesis which I shall explore here is

that the apparent failure of the critique of anthropocentrism to carry the same conviction as other liberatory critiques may reflect problems and limitations not only in the understanding of its critics but also in the way the concept of anthropocentrism has been developed by its major exponents in ecophilosophy. In what follows, I attempt to resolve the dilemma outlined above by showing how certain difficulties for the critique arise out of a specific, problematic understanding of anthropocentrism which I will call cosmic

anthropocentrism. Using concepts and models originating in feminine theory and other liberation critiques, I will outline an

alternative, feminist rereading of the concept of human-centeredness which is theoretically illuminating, of practical value to the Green movement, and capable of showing why anthropocentrism might be a serious problem in contemporary life. I shall argue that it is this problematic understanding of anthropocentrism as cosmic anthropocentrism which has invited the kinds of criticisms which have been widely seen as fatal to the concept.

QUEERNESS

Perm do both- the alt and the aff aren't mutually exclusive. Ecofeminism includes queer bodies when it talks about the feminine Other

Nhanenge, 2007- M.A. in Development Studies from the University of South Africa (Jytte, February 2007, "Ecofeminism: Towards Integrating the Concerns of Women, Poor People, and Nature into Development,"

<http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/570/dissertation.pdf?sequence=1>, Accessed: 7/8/14 FG)

Ecological feminism or ecofeminism is an umbrella term for a variety of different positions concerned with the connection between the unjustified domination of women, people of colour, traditional people, poor people and the unjustified domination of nature. (Warren 2000: 1). Below these connection will be called 'women-Others-nature'. "Others" is with a capital O in order to distinguish it from the general word "others". "Others" conceptualises the diverse groups of subordinate people. These include children, people of colour, poor people, traditional people, old, frail and sick people, homosexual people, disabled people and other marginalised groups of people. Nature include all that which is not human nor human made like non-human animals, plants, bio-organisms, water, air, soil, mountains etc.

(DIS)ABILITY

Perm do both- the alt and the aff aren't mutually exclusive. Ecofeminism includes people with disabilities when it talks about the feminine Other

Nhanenge, 2007- M.A. in Development Studies from the University of South Africa (Jytte, February 2007, "Ecofeminism: Towards Integrating the Concerns of Women, Poor People, and Nature into Development,"

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RACE

Perm do both- the alt and the aff aren't mutually exclusive. Ecofeminism includes people of color when it talks about the feminine Other

Nhanenge, 2007- M.A. in Development Studies from the University of South Africa (Jytte, February 2007, "Ecofeminism: Towards Integrating the Concerns of Women, Poor People, and Nature into Development,"

<http://uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10500/570/dissertation.pdf?sequence=1>, Accessed: 7/8/14 FG)

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CRITICISM OF IN-ROUND GENDERED LANGUAGE

Their usage of the term “you guys” is a reason to reject the team- gendered language perpetuates the violence against women by privileging the man in the abstract in the abstract and the flesh and erases feminine specificity.

Gehlert 7 -- Communications Specialist at Berkeley Media Studies Group (Heather, “Can the Term “Guys” Refer to Women and Girls?”, Alternet, February 27, 2007, http://www.alternet.org/story/48527/can_the_term_%22guys%22_refer_to_women_and_girls) */LEA

edited for ablest language, we don't endorse ablest language

Yet, for whatever reason, now that my dad and I live in different states and I see him only once or twice a year, I'm noticing how often men and women use the phrase “you guys” to refer to both sexes. It happens in restaurants, at council meetings -- even in grade-school classrooms. And so, a voice in the back of my head is starting to say, Maybe he has a point. Maybe this isn't an arbitrary battle over an arbitrary word. A cursory glance at blog postings shows that the use of the word “guys” is much more discussed and much more controversial than I had realized. Giving credence to my dad's argument, dozens of postings read something like this: Try walking up to a group of men and women and saying, “Hey, girls, how's it going?” The reaction won't be positive. The men in the group probably won't find the feminine label amusing -- and certainly not arbitrary. So why is the reverse acceptable? Why is “girls” gender-specific, but “guys” is not? “Is it because men are not considered gendered, like white people do not consider themselves a race or European-Americans ethnic?” writes Farrah Ferriell, an instructor at the Women's Studies Program at Western Kentucky University. “I say yes ...” A few posts down on the same site, Kathy Ferguson, a teacher from Hawaii, writes, “You know, I think I find myself in the “get a life” camp on these questions. ... “[Y]ou guys” [can be said] with affection. Words don't have inherent meanings, after all; they have the meanings that usage gives them, and are not necessarily stuck in past patriarchal contexts. I also find that I have many more important struggles in my classrooms than these.” Ferguson's point that words don't have inherent meanings is a good one. “He” could easily be a feminine pronoun and “she” a masculine word if we used them that way. However, “guys” is not a brand new term. And it's already gendered in many circumstances. “Guy” is masculine (e.g. That guy over there is really attractive). “The guys” is too (e.g. Will the guys in the room please stand up?). So, the distinction -- and the controversy -- seems to lie with the colloquial phrase, “you guys.” That distinction makes me curious to know how many people consciously think “you guys” is gender-neutral and how many are just so used to hearing and saying it that they don't even notice its prevalence. In my case, I had never consciously thought the term was gender-neutral; rather, I had just never carefully considered it until my dad brought it to my attention. Even if the majority of people really have thought deeply about this issue and still maintain that “you guys” is gender-neutral, why are generic words always male? I have a hard time seeing {recognizing} any difference between “guys” and words like “mankind” or “Congressman.” At one time, those words, too, were considered generic. But now we know they're not -- they're laden with meaning. **They make women invisible by reinforcing the idea that men are the norm against which women are compared.** Why, then, would we want to risk repeating the same mistake? Especially when the solution is as simple as replacing “you guys” with “you all.” True, this issue is not as pressing as, say, the war in Iraq or homelessness in San Francisco. But that does not mean it is not legitimate. Just because there's a war in Iraq, does that mean that the divorce someone is going through is any less real or painful? That being fired suddenly feels great? That getting a traffic ticket sucks any less? Or perhaps a better example: Just because slapping a woman isn't as serious as raping her, does that mean we should ignore the former? On its face, using the term “you guys” seems harmless enough -- gendered or not. But as the number of people who see {recognize} it as gendered grows, so does the phrase's power to influence ideas about identity -- to perpetuate the subtle yet damaging belief that being male is more valuable than being female. And the consequences of that extend far beyond the momentary awkwardness of me having lunch with my dad.

AT

Seriously, just apologize & make an honest effort not to misgender your opponents again. I would not read any ev, or say anything else other than this because with an apology, it would be a double turn.

DEEP ECOLOGY

PRO- DEEP ECOLOGY

CHALLENGES ANTHRO

Deep ecology is egalitarian in principle – challenges anthropocentrism

Sessions, 91 – retired philosophy and humanities professor from Iowa City, Iowa, works as an ethics consultant for the Cedar Rapids (Iowa) Community School District (Robert, "Deep Ecology versus Ecofeminism: Healthy Differences or Incompatible Philosophies?," Ecological Feminist Philosophies, Indiana University Press, pp. 138-139 – edited by Karen Warren)//schnall

Deep Ecology According to Arne Naess, who coined the "deep ecology" label and who is looked upon by most deep ecologists as a seminal thinker in this tradition, deep ecology has eight basic characteristics, the first four of which he claims are conceptually fundamental: "(1) The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human Life on Earth have value in themselves. These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes. (2) Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in themselves. (3) Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs. (4) The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of non-human life requires such a decrease" (Naess 1986, 14). Naess and the many deep ecologists who agree with him begin by asserting the fundamental equality and inherent value of all beings and then draw inferences for human action from their original anti-anthropomorphism. Warwick Fox sums up deep ecology as wanting to encourage an egalitarian attitude that "within obvious kinds of practical limits, allows entities (including humans) the freedom to unfold in their own way unhindered by the various forms of human domination" (Fox 1989, 6). This central concern with "ecocentric egalitarianism" (Fox's label) leads deep ecologists to oppose, above all else, the historical Western propensity to place humans at the center of the moral universe (to be anthropocentric). Deep ecologists trace most environmental destruction to the anthropocentric attitude that says (1) nonhuman nature has no value in itself, (2) humans (and/or God, if theistic) create what value there is, and (3) humans have the right (some would say the obligation) to do as they please with and in the nonhuman world as long as they do not harm other humans' interests. Thus deep ecologists criticize the human centeredness of prevailing Western attitudes and ethics by claiming that there are no good reasons in general for valuing a member of a species or a whole species over another individual or species or over any given ecosystem. They are not against human flourishing, but deep ecologists believe that this flourishing can generally occur without the destructive domination of nonhuman nature by humans, and insofar as it can, it should. Naess and other deep ecologists believe we need an ethic that is not a mere extension of existing humanist ethics. Animal liberationist Peter Singer, for example, argues that we can provide a theoretical basis for vegetarianism by extending utilitarianism to include all sentient beings. Deep ecologists criticize Singer and other "extensionists" for holding onto "an increasingly arbitrary perspective in an age when the ecological imagination can shift reference points within the system and imagine the world to some extent from the standpoint of the muskrat and its environment" (Naess 1973, 96). Extensions of human-centered ethics perpetuate an unjustifiable bias humans have toward their own. Thus, just as an ethic that begins with men as distinct from women is sexist, utilitarianism (the best of the humanistic lot in this regard) and other Western ethics are "speciesist." Deep ecology tries to begin with a foundation that does not arbitrarily set "man apart" (to borrow a phrase from Robinson Jeffers). Hans Jonas puts the difference between shallow and deep ecology this way: "Only an ethic which is grounded in the breadth of being, not merely in the singularity or oddness of man, can have significance in the scheme of things" (Jonas 1983, 284).

ANTI- DEEP ECOLOGY

ANTHRO

Reject their connotation of the human – prerequisite to abandoning anthropocentrism and androcentrism

Plumwood, 91 – Australian ecofeminist intellectual and activist, Australian Research Council Fellow at the Australian National University (Val, "Nature, Self, and Gender," *Ecological Feminist Philosophies*, Indiana University Press, pp. 168-170 – edited by Karen Warren)//schnall

V. THE PROBLEM IN TERMS OF THE CRITIQUE OF RATIONALISM I now show how the problem of the inferiorization of nature appears if it is viewed from the perspective of the critique of rationalism and seen as part of the general problem of revaluing and reintegrating what rationalist culture has split apart, denied, and devalued. Such an account shifts the focus away from the preoccupations of both mainstream ethical approaches and deep ecology, and although it does retain an emphasis on the account of the self as central, it gives a different account from that offered by deep ecology. In section VI. I conclude by arguing that one of the effects of this shift in focus is to make connections with other critiques, especially feminism, central rather than peripheral or accidental, as they are currently viewed by deep ecologists in particular. First, what is missing from the accounts of both the ethical philosophers and the deep ecologists is an understanding of the problem of discontinuity as created by a dualism linked to a network of related dualisms. Here I believe a good deal can be learned from the critique of dualism feminist philosophy has developed and from the understanding of the mechanisms of dualisms ecofeminists have produced. A dualistically construed dichotomy typically polarizes difference and minimizes shared characteristics, construes difference along lines of superiority/inferiority, and views the inferior side as a means to the higher ends of the superior side (the instrumental thesis). Because its nature is defined oppositionally, the task of the superior side, that in which it realizes itself and expresses its true nature, is to separate from, dominate, and control the lower side. This has happened both with the human/nature division and with other related dualisms such as masculine/feminine, reason/body, and reason/emotion. Challenging these dualisms involves not just a reevaluation of superiority/inferiority and a higher status for the underside of the dualisms (in this case nature) but also a reexamination and reconceptualizing of the dualistically construed categories themselves. So in the case of the human/nature dualism it is not just a question of improving the status of nature, moral or otherwise, while everything else remains the same, but of reexamining and reconceptualizing the concept of the human, and also the concept of the contrasting class of nature. For the concept of the human, of what it is to be fully and authentically human, and of what is genuinely human in the set of characteristics typical humans possess, has been defined oppositionally, by exclusion of what is associated with the inferior natural sphere in very much the way that Lloyd (1983), for example, has shown in the case of the categories of masculine and feminine, and of reason and its contrasts. Humans have both biological and mental characteristics, but the mental rather than the biological have been taken to be characteristic of the human and to give what is "fully and authentically" human. The term "human" is, of course, not merely descriptive here but very much an evaluative term setting out an ideal: it is what is essential or worthwhile in the human that excludes the natural. It is not necessarily denied that humans have some material or animal component—rather, it is seen in this framework as alien or inessential to them, not part of their fully or truly human nature. The human essence is often seen as lying in maximizing control over the natural sphere (both within and without) and in qualities such as rationality, freedom, and transcendence of the material sphere. These qualities are also identified as masculine, and hence the oppositional model of the human coincides or converges with a masculine model, in which the characteristics attributed are those of the masculine ideal. Part of a strategy for challenging this human/nature dualism, then, would involve recognition of these excluded qualities—split off, denied, or construed as alien, or comprehended as the sphere of supposedly inferior humans such as women and blacks—as equally and fully human. This would provide a basis for the recognition of continuities with the natural world. Thus reproductivity, sensuality, emotionality would be taken to be as fully and authentically human qualities as the capacity for abstract planning and calculation. This proceeds from the assumption that one basis for discontinuity and alienation from nature is alienation from those qualities which provide continuity with nature in ourselves. This connection between the rationalist account of nature within and nature without has powerful repercussions. So part of what is involved is a challenge to the centrality and dominance of the rational in the account of the human self. Such a challenge would have far-reaching implications for what is valuable in human society and culture, and it connects with the challenge to the cultural legacy of rationalism made by other critiques of rationalism such as feminism, and by critiques of technocracy, bureaucracy, and instrumentalism. What is involved here is a reconceptualization of the human side of the human/nature dualism, to free it from the legacy of rationalism. Also in need of reconceptualization is the

underside of this dualism, the concept of nature, which is construed in polarized terms as bereft of qualities appropriated to the human side, as passive and lacking in agency and teleology, as pure materiality, pure body, or pure mechanism. So what is called for here is the development of alternatives to mechanistic ways of viewing the world, which are also part of the legacy of rationalism.

FEM

Deep ecology ignores the oppression of women, thus exhibiting male-gender bias Sessions, 91 – retired philosophy and humanities professor from Iowa City, Iowa, works as an ethics consultant for the Cedar Rapids (Iowa) Community School District (Robert, “Deep Ecology versus Ecofeminism: Healthy Differences or Incompatible Philosophies?,” *Ecological Feminist Philosophies*, Indiana University Press, pp. 144-145 – edited by Karen Warren)//schnall

While there are intimate ties between analysis and solution, let us begin sorting out this dispute by differentiating deep ecology's diagnosis from its prescriptions to see just where and how ecofeminists find deep ecology lacking. Warren's analysis of the logic of domination concentrates on the diagnosis, while Cheney's alternative to deep ecology's images of unity is concerned mainly with prescriptions. At first glance Warren's analysis seems to add to or extend the basic critical analysis of deep ecology. Warwick Fox quotes "one ecofeminist-cum-deep ecologist" who read Warren's 1987 article and wondered "why she doesn't just call it [Warren's transformative feminism] deep ecology?" (Fox 1989,14). For what Warren does, says Fox, is to show that the logic of domination that deep ecology sees as the source of naturism has its parallels in sexism, racism, and classism. According to Fox, anthropomorphism is what deep ecologists call this logic and attitude ("ideology") in human/nature relationships (Fox 1989, 19). He further contends that deep ecologists encourage an attitude of egalitarianism "toward all entities in the ecosphere—including humans" (1989, 21). Moreover, deep ecologists "completely agree with ecofeminists that men have been far more implicated in the history of ecological destruction than women. However, deep ecologists also agree with similar charges derived from other social perspectives: for example, that capitalists, whites, and Westerners have been far more implicated in the history of ecological destruction than pre-capitalist peoples, blacks, and non-Westerners" (1989,14). Human centeredness, not a particular group of humans, is the target of deep ecology; thus, Fox claims that contrary to Cheney and other ecofeminists, deep ecologists are not androcentric. Is Fox correct in his contention that the crucial difference between deep ecology and ecofeminism is a matter of focus—that deep ecology has its eye on environmental relations while ecofeminism is more concerned with how the logic of domination is also played out on women? Not according to Warren. She believes that the gendered nature of the logic of domination is more than an accident of history. She believes that feminism should be ecological at its core because the domination of nature and the domination of women are parts of a whole, and she believes that any satisfactory environmental philosophy must be feminist for the same reasons. She gives three arguments for the latter claim: (1) for the sake of historical accuracy we must "acknowledge the feminization of nature and the naturalization of women as part of the exploitation of nature"; (2) the oppressive dual dominations of women and nature at least in the West are "located in [a] patriarchal conceptual framework," and to ignore this connection is to give, at best, "an incomplete, inaccurate, and partial account of what is required of a conceptually adequate environmental ethic"; and (3) at least in contemporary culture the word feminist helps to clarify how the domination and liberation of nature are conceptually linked to patriarchy and its demise. Warren adds that "without the addition of the word 'feminist,' one presents environmental ethics as if it has no bias, including male-gender bias, which is just what ecofeminists deny: failure to notice the connections between the twin oppressions of women and nature is male-gender bias" (Warren 1990, 144). This exchange between Fox and Warren, who are in many ways quite close in their concerns and analyses, helps to pinpoint what seems to be a critical difference between ecofeminism and deep ecology with regard to their diagnoses of the philosophical sources of environmental destructiveness. Warren and Cheney talk about this difference by emphasizing that the logic of domination is accompanied by a set of values: The third feature of oppressive conceptual frameworks is the most significant. A logic of domination is not just a logical structure. It also involves a substantive value system, since an ethical premise is needed to permit or sanction the "just" subordination of that which is subordinate. (Warren 1990, 128) According to this ecofeminist criticism, FOX, like Naess and other deep ecologists, emphasizes an abstract equality between humans and all other beings, while ecofeminism is against the logic of domination and the particular historical values that result in the domination of a particular set of entities.